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Artistic Justice: How the Executive
Branch Can Facilitate Nazi-Looted
Art Restitution
Eight decades after the Holocaust, many pieces of art stolen from Jewish
families still sit in the state-owned museums of former Nazi-aligned
regimes. In an effort to right old wrongs, plaintiffs are bringing suit in
the United States against the foreign governments who retain the art
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act’s expropriation exception,
which permits aggrieved plaintiffs to sue foreign countries for property
that was illegally taken in violation of international law. But circuit
courts are split as to whether these suits against foreign sovereigns
should be allowed to go forward. This Note analyzes the divergent
interpretations of the expropriation exception. Namely, whether the
commercial activity of a foreign sovereign’s agencies and
instrumentalities (in this case, a museum displaying stolen art) is
enough to confer jurisdiction on the foreign sovereign itself. This Note
argues that the executive should act to create a series of executive
agreements that encourage arbitration or compensation through an
established trust for Nazi-looted art claims. These agreements could
reduce the foreign policy blunders of U.S. federal court litigation while
giving survivors a real opportunity for restitution.
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Then why bother with recovering it at all? Plundering is,
after all, the handmaiden of war. And the world’s
museums are filled with objects lifted during conflicts
from the Romans on. But this is no Elgin Marbles
controversy. The Nazis weren’t simply out to enrich
themselves. Their looting was part of the Final Solution.
They wanted to eradicate a race by extinguishing its
culture as well as its people. This gives these works of art
a unique resonance . . . . The objects are symbols of a
terrible crime; recovering them is an equally symbolic
form of justice.1
INTRODUCTION
The number of living survivors of the Holocaust is dwindling,
but their stories endure as an instruction in humanity—a cautionary
tale about allowing hate to run its course. Yet today, almost eighty
years after the Holocaust, some wrongs have not been righted.
One hundred thousand pieces of art and cultural relics that the
Nazis stole during the Holocaust have not been returned to their
original owners.2 Instead, these paintings sit in state-owned museums
that profit off their display. The fight between the surviving families
1.
Eric Gibson, The Art of to Whom Art Belongs, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 1999, 12:09 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB932095815373557335 [https://perma.cc/E5QA-BRAL].
2.
See Stuart E. Eizenstat, Art Stolen by the Nazis Is Still Missing. Here’s How We Can
Recover It., WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/no-one-shouldtrade-in-or-possess-art-stolen-by-the-nazis/2019/01/02/01990232-0ed3-11e9-831f3aa2c2be4cbd_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.7d94dade9394
[https://perma.cc/XA7WFB3Y] [hereinafter Art Stolen by the Nazis].
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and the former Nazi-aligned regimes that possess the paintings
demonstrates a seemingly intractable problem—how to deliver some
measure of justice to Holocaust survivors while balancing the complex
foreign affairs implications that accompany them. No family’s story
better exemplifies this struggle than the Herzogs’.
Baron Mór Lipót Herzog loved art. So much so that, during his
lifetime, he compiled a collection worth—at some estimates—$100
million.3 Baron Herzog, a Hungarian nobleman, gained a reputation as
one of Europe’s preeminent art collectors.4 Baron Herzog was also
Jewish.5 When he died in 1934, he passed his collection on to his wife
and children,6 presumably with the hope that it would stay within his
family for many generations. Unfortunately, neither he nor the rest of
the world foresaw the turmoil that would soon engulf Europe.
As part of the campaign of humiliation and dehumanization
against Hungary’s Jewish population, Nazi officials systematically
deprived Hungarian Jews of their property, assets, and family
treasures.7 In 1944, the Herzog family attempted to hide their vast art
collection underneath a family factory.8 They did not succeed—Adolf
Eichmann, a Nazi official, intercepted the effort and confiscated the
artwork.9 After taking some choice pieces for display in Germany, he
sent the remainder to the Hungarian government for its state-owned
museums.10 The family was relatively lucky—most were able to escape,
with the exception of one of Baron Herzog’s sons, who died doing forced
labor.11
The Herzog family’s art, known as the “Herzog Collection,” still
sits in Hungary’s state-owned museums.12 The family has been
embroiled in a seven-decade struggle to get their art collection home.13
3.
Carol Vogel, Hungary Sued in Holocaust Art Claim, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/arts/design/28lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/7Y23-PJDW].
The director of Hungary’s Museum of Fine Arts once bragged that acquiring the Herzog family’s
art would make the museum a “world-level collection” rivaled only by the Museo del Prado in
Madrid. See NICHOLAS M. O’DONNELL, A TRAGIC FATE: LAW AND ETHICS IN THE BATTLE OVER NAZILOOTED ART 258 (2017).
4.
O’DONNELL, supra note 3, at 255 (the collection included works from El Greco, Lucas
Cranach the Elder, van Dyck, Velázquez, and prominent Hungarian painters like Mihály
Munkácsy).
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
Vogel, supra note 3.
8.
de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
9.
Id.
10. Id.
11. O’DONNELL, supra note 3, at 255–58.
12. de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1098.
13. At one point, Hungary did return some of the collection to the family but only on shortterm loan; the family claims that they were harassed relentlessly for the return of the art, and
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Most recently, they attempted to sue Hungary in the U.S. federal court
system. But their effort failed when they lost in the D.C. Circuit and
the Supreme Court denied certiorari.14
For the Herzogs,15 this struggle is about reclaiming their rightful
property. Their lawsuit, however, highlights an area of ambiguity in
U.S. law that has far-reaching implications—not just for descendants
of Holocaust survivors seeking the return of family heirlooms but for
U.S. foreign relations and foreign direct investment suits as well.
Whether the Herzogs’ suit against Hungary should have moved
forward—and by extension, whether other litigants should enjoy a more
relaxed barrier to suits against foreign sovereigns—depends upon the
proper interpretation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”)
and its expropriation exception.16 Without Supreme Court clarification
on the exception, the lower courts are at an impasse—some courts
interpret the expropriation exception in a way that mandates different
jurisdictional requirements for foreign states and their agencies and
instrumentalities, but others do not.17 The Herzogs’ suit is not unique.
In fact, it is one of many cases brought by Holocaust survivors and their
descendants against former Nazi-aligned regimes and other European
countries over the last several decades.18
This Note analyzes the divergent interpretations of the
expropriation exception—the “alternative threshold approach” of the
D.C. and Second Circuits and the “either-or approach” of the Ninth

eventually they gave the pieces back for display in the Museum of Fine Arts in 1948. O’DONNELL,
supra note 3, at 258–59. Once the Iron Curtain fell in Budapest, the family largely suspended its
efforts to recover the art. Id. at 259. Decades later the U.S.S.R. dissolved, and one of Baron
Herzog’s daughters sued in Hungary for the return of the art. Id. After an initial win ordered the
return of eleven paintings, an appellate court reversed the decision. Id. Hungary promised to
appoint a state commissioner to investigate claims such as the Herzog family’s, but never did. Id.
Not long after, in July 2010, the Herzogs brought suit in the United States. Id.
14. de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1098. The Supreme Court denied de Csepel’s petition for certiorari,
so the family will not be able to sue Hungary in the United States federal court system absent
action on the part of Congress. See de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 139 S. Ct. 784 (mem.) (2019)
(denial of petition for certiorari).
15. The named plaintiff in this case is David de Csepel; while he does not share the Herzog
name, he is the great-grandson of Baron Herzog. Vogel, supra note 3.
16. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012).
17. See de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1104–08 (holding that the jurisdictional requirements for
foreign states and their agencies/instrumentalities are different under the FSIA); Altmann v.
Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2002) (permitting the plaintiff to sue a foreign
state and its agencies and instrumentalities under the same requirements), aff’d on other grounds,
514 U.S. 677 (2004).
18. See, e.g., de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1104–08; Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019,
1032–34, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010); Garb v. Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d 579, 589 (2d Cir. 2006);
Altmann, 317 F.3d at 958.
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Circuit.19 This Note does not examine how various treaty commitments
or exhaustion requirements might interact with such claims nor does it
examine the merits of the Herzogs’ claims.20 Part I examines the text
and history of the FSIA to give context to the exception’s purpose and
meaning. Part II considers the current circuit split. Part III analyzes
how the circuit split affects suits beyond Nazi-era art claims—
specifically foreign direct investment. Part IV proposes executive action
that would address the unique jurisdictional and procedural challenges
accompanying Nazi-era art restitution claims.
While the jurisdictional issue addressed by this Note is
relatively narrow, the broader field of Nazi-looted art cases is complex
and intricate, often leading to protracted litigation and an amalgam of
applicable law and standards.21 The FSIA provides some guidance on
art restitution suits against former Nazi-aligned nations, but there is
no comprehensive statute governing these types of claims.22 Thus,
commentators have appropriately termed these cases “labyrinthine
proceeding[s]” for their complex trajectory of trial and appellate court
proceedings, and the jurisdictional and procedural hurdles that
accompany them.23 These claims are “governed by a patchwork of state,
federal, and transnational legal materials—American common law,
statutory law, and constitutional law, along with public and private
international law and the substantive laws of European countries.”24
Experts in this field call the withheld artwork of Jewish Holocaust
victims “the last prisoners of war,”25 a phrase that reflects the pain
associated with the remembrance of the Nazis’ attempt to destroy the
legacy of European Jews.26 In some sense, the plaintiffs in these cases

19. Compare de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1104–08 (using the “alternative threshold approach”),
and Garb, 440 F.3d at 589 (using the “alternative threshold approach”), with Altmann, 317 F.3d
at 958 (using the “either-or approach”).
20. There is also a wealth of litigation on these issues. E.g., Philipp v. Federal Republic of
Germany, 894 F.3d 406 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
21. BRUCE L. HAY, NAZI-LOOTED ART AND THE LAW: THE AMERICAN CASES 5–6 (2017).
22. Id. at 6.
23. Id. at 5–6.
24. Id. at 6.
25. Valerie J. Nelson, Elan Steinberg Dies at 59; Former Head of the World Jewish Congress,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2012) http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/11/local/la-me-elan-steinberg20120411 [https://perma.cc/3NQF-T4YY] (stating that Elan Steinberg is credited with first calling
Nazi-looted art pieces “the last prisoners of war”).
26. See Charles Dellheim, Framing Nazi Art Loot, in THE ART OF BEING JEWISH IN MODERN
TIMES 321 (Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett & Jonathan Karp eds., 2008):
What began mainly as a story about Nazis stealing art treasures recovered by
courageous “monuments men” has gradually been cast as a Jewish tragedy. Whereas
Nazi art theft was first regarded as an assault on national cultural legacies, it has now
become a chapter in the story of the Shoah. The fate of the “last prisoners of war” . . . has
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are also prisoners—they are trapped by this labyrinthine legal system
that is complex and confusing, adding more urgency to find a solution
expediently.27 Regardless of the merits of one jurisdictional argument
versus another, this is an area of the law that represents deeply
personal and trying memories for its plaintiffs.
I. THE ADVENT OF THE FSIA AND WHY FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
MATTERS
A. An Overview of Foreign Sovereign Immunity in U.S. Law
Prior to the 1976 enactment of the FSIA, no codified law
regarding the immunity of foreign states in U.S. federal courts
existed.28 The concept of foreign sovereign immunity originated in the
time of monarchs.29 Because sovereign monarchs were equal to each
other—par in parem non habet imperium—one sovereign monarch
could not be subject to suit at the behest of another.30 Even as monarchs
dwindled on the world stage, states continued to honor this
commitment to one another, justifying it as a matter of equality and
dignity amongst the nations.31
One of the earliest—and certainly one of the most prominent—
expressions of foreign sovereign immunity in the United States is Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.32 In
The Schooner Exchange, two U.S. citizens attempted to sue the French
government in a U.S. court for ship theft.33 Marshall’s opinion held that
become a touchstone for memory—memories of belonging and betrayal, courage and
collaboration.
27. Si Frumkin, a Holocaust survivor, once wrote of his frustration with the U.S.
government’s failure to assist him in recovering lost possessions: “I am a law-abiding American
citizen . . . . In return, I expect my government to fulfill its obligations to me . . . .” Si Frumkin,
Why Won’t Those SOBs Give Me My Money?: A Survivor’s Perspective, in HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY 92 (Michael J. Bazyler & Roger P. Alford eds.,
2006).
28. See Thomas H. Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immunity,
50 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 156 (1981) (“[The FSIA’s] provisions effect substantial changes from
prior law, which was outdated, uncertain and heavily influenced by foreign policy considerations
of the executive branch of government.”).
29. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 314–15 (4th
ed. 2015).
30. Id. at 315.
31. Id. (“Over time, the idea of an identity between state and federal ruler faded away, but
states continued to extend to other states an absolute immunity from jurisdiction to adjudicate
and jurisdiction to enforce. Governments justified these broad immunities by reference to the
dignity, equality, and independence of states.”).
32. See id. at 316–17 (providing The Schooner Exchange as an example of the classical view
of sovereign immunity); see also The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 117–20 (1812).
33. The Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 117–20.
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the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity barred the domestic suit
against the French government for two principal reasons: (1) failing to
protect foreign sovereigns against suit in domestic courts would
undermine the equality of nations and (2) permitting suit against other
nations could potentially damage U.S. foreign policy initiatives and
goals.34 In his opinion, Marshall emphasized judicial deference to the
executive in the realm of foreign affairs.35
In response to increasing globalization over one hundred years
after The Schooner Exchange, the State Department issued the Tate
Letter in 195236 as a plea to courts to recognize the “restrictive theory”
of sovereign immunity.37 The restrictive theory differs from the absolute
theory of sovereign immunity in that it grants state immunity only for
public acts (jure imperii), not private ones (jure gestionis).38 The Tate
Letter was largely ineffective. One main reason it was ineffective was
that it failed to adequately distinguish public acts from private acts.39
Further complicating matters, different branches approached
immunity with varying standards, making it difficult for foreign
litigants to nail down a clear jurisdictional rule.40 Foreign litigants
believed the determination of who received immunity was largely a
political one.41 The Tate Letter exposed a need for a codified, uniform
set of criteria in immunity determinations.42

34. Id. at 136–39; see also Hill, supra note 28, at 163–64 (explaining Marshall’s rationale for
extending sovereign immunity to foreign states).
35. The Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 146. This idea was reinforced in Republic of Mexico v.
Hoffman, where the Court explained, “[I]t is a guiding principle in determining whether a court
should exercise or surrender its jurisdiction in such cases, that the courts should not so act as to
embarrass the executive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs.” 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945); see DUNOFF
ET AL., supra note 29, at 318.
36. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman,
Acting Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984, 984–85
(1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter].
37. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 319. The Tate Letter also stated that, going forward,
the U.S. State Department would adhere to “the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.” Id. at
320 (quoting Tate Letter, supra note 36, at 984).
38. Id. at 319.
39. Id. at 321.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. (“Dissatisfaction with the perceived politicization of the process for deciding
immunity and a desire for greater predictability led practitioners, scholars, and the State
Department itself to urge reforms that would remove the Department from the process of
determining immunity.”).
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B. Why a Statutory Mandate on Sovereign Immunity? Explaining the
FSIA’s Purpose
Congress passed the FSIA in 1976—a much needed update to
the Tate Letter immunity regime—which codified the restrictive view
of sovereign immunity and outlined the exclusive means for obtaining
jurisdiction in the United States over foreign nations and their agencies
and instrumentalities.43 The FSIA provides that all foreign sovereigns
are immune from suit in the United States unless they fall within one
of several enumerated exceptions,44 including, but not limited to, “(1)
waiver, (2) commercial acts, (3) expropriations, (4) rights in certain
kinds of property in the United States, (5) non-commercial torts, and (6)
enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards.”45 Extensive litigation
emerged surrounding the breadth and scope of the exceptions.46
Notably, in 2004, the Supreme Court held that the FSIA applied
retroactively to conduct that took place before its enactment—a
significant win for Holocaust victims and their descendants wishing to
bring suit against foreign governments in U.S. courts because the
Holocaust preceded the FSIA’s enactment.47
The policy concerns underlying the passage of the FSIA also
instruct how courts should interpret the Act. Congress shifted the
responsibility for immunity determinations from the executive to the
judiciary to tamp down on arbitrary immunity designations and provide
robust guidance on when to deny immunity.48 The FSIA also clarified
and standardized the field of immunity determinations; but for the
listed exceptions, states are presumptively immune.49 The Act also
anticipates the tension between providing a forum for aggrieved
plaintiffs and guarding against judicial interference in the realm of
43. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2012); DUNOFF ET AL., supra
note 29, at 320.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012); DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 320.
45. David P. Stewart, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Guide for Judges, FED. JUD.
CTR. 41 (2013), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/FSIAGuide2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZR4Q-JGZP].
46. See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010) (declaring unanimously that the
FSIA does not govern foreign officials’ immunity claims); Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349,
362–63 (1993) (holding that Saudi Arabia’s imprisonment and torture of an American did not
qualify as commercial activity under the FSIA’s 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) exception); Republic of
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618–19 (1992) (establishing the “direct effects” test for
the FSIA’s commercial activity exception).
47. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004). The story of the Altmann litigation
is portrayed in the 2015 movie Woman in Gold. WOMAN IN GOLD (BBC Films 2015).
48. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 320 (explaining how “[d]issatisfaction with the perceived
politicization of the process for deciding immunity and a desire for greater predictability led” to
the FSIA, which placed immunity determinations in the hands of the judiciary).
49. Id.
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foreign relations, as evidenced by the FSIA’s statement of purpose,
which declares Congress’s intent to “protect the rights of both foreign
states and litigants in United States courts.”50 Congress was concerned
that “err[ing] in the former direction could implicate foreign policy
concerns, while being over solicitous of the status of foreign states could
make it impossible for aggrieved parties to be made whole.”51
C. The Expropriation Exception and Court Confusion
Despite the FSIA’s enactment, courts still struggle to balance
the competing interests of foreign relations and court access for
aggrieved plaintiffs. The case law interpreting the expropriation
exception is a prime example. Courts are split between two
interpretations of the exception,52 with each interpretation vindicating
either foreign relations or court access.53 These dueling approaches
came to head in the de Csepel litigation, where the application of the
expropriation exception was one of the key issues.54 The expropriation
exception is codified at § 1605(a)(3) of the FSIA and provides that
foreign states are not immune from U.S. jurisdiction in cases
in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that
property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state;
or that property or any property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is
engaged in a commercial activity in the United States.55

Put simply, the expropriation exception requires (1) the taking
of property that violates international law and (2) a commercial activity
connection to the United States.56 In cases alleging art theft by Naziassociated regimes, where the facts are not in dispute, the first
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012); Jason E. Myers, Note, Preserving International Comity: The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 and OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 90 S. CAL. L.
REV. 913, 914 (2017).
51. Myers, supra note 50 (alteration in original) (quoting Lucian C. Martinez, Jr., Sovereign
Impunity: Does the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Bar Lawsuits Against the Holy See in
Clerical Sexual Abuse Cases?, 44 TEX. INT’L L.J. 123, 125 (2008)).
52. de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094, 1104–08 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Altmann v.
Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 958, 967–69 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d on other grounds, 514 U.S.
677 (2004).
53. See infra Part II.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012); de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1100.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
56. Case Comment, D.C. Circuit Interprets Expropriation Exception to Allow Genocide
Victims to Sue Their Own Government, 131 HARV. L. REV. 650, 652 (2017) [hereinafter D.C. Circuit
Interprets] (“First, there must be property ‘taken in violation of international law,’ and second,
there must be a commercial nexus—some connection between the defendants or the property and
a commercial activity in the United States.”).
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requirement is easily satisfied, as courts have ruled that the taking of
property during the commission of a genocide violates international
law.57 The exact nature and parameters of the commercial activity in
connection to the foreign sovereign itself is the subject of the hotly
debated circuit split examined in this Note.58
Federal courts take divergent approaches to the FSIA’s
expropriation exception, which provides two possible commercial
activity nexus requirements.59 The first commercial activity nexus
refers to the language addressing foreign states;60 the second
commercial activity nexus refers to language tied to agencies and
instrumentalities.61 The first commercial activity nexus requires that
the property at issue is both (1) present in the United States and (2)
being used in connection with a commercial activity in the United
States.62 The second commercial activity nexus, on the other hand, does
not require property to be in the United States.63 It merely requires that
the property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of
the foreign country and that the property is then used for a commercial
activity in the United States.64 Some courts hold that the jurisdictional
requirements for states and a state’s agencies and instrumentalities are
different.65 In other words, some courts hold that a plaintiff must satisfy
either the first or second commercial activity nexus depending on
whether the defendant is a foreign nation or a foreign nation’s agencies
or instrumentalities.66 Other courts have held that satisfying either
commercial activity nexus is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over a

57. Id. (“[T]he Hungarian government’s seizure of property from Jewish citizens constituted
genocide, and genocide is a violation of international law . . . . Judge Tatel concluded that the
plaintiffs had described a taking of property in violation of international law that could be covered
by the expropriation exception.”).
58. See infra Part II.
59. See de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1104–08 (holding that the jurisdictional requirements for
foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities are different under the FSIA); Altmann v.
Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 967–69 (9th Cir. 2002) (declining to distinguish between
jurisdictional requirements for states and their agencies and instrumentalities), aff’d on other
grounds, 514 U.S. 677 (2004).
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (“[P]roperty or any property exchanged for such property is
present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state . . . .”).
61. See id. (“[P]roperty or any property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by
an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in
a commercial activity in the United States . . . .”).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094, 1104–08 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
66. Id.
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foreign nation.67 The FSIA defines agencies and instrumentalities as
any entity
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is an organ of
a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (3)
which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section
1332(c) and (e) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third country.68

The heart of the dispute is whether the commercial activity of a
foreign sovereign’s agencies and instrumentalities is enough to confer
jurisdiction on the foreign sovereign itself. Put another way, can a
plaintiff secure jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign merely by
satisfying § 1605(a)(3)’s second commercial activity nexus? While the
Ninth Circuit extends jurisdiction to the foreign state itself if a plaintiff
satisfies the second commercial activity nexus, the D.C. Circuit and the
Second Circuit do not.69 The commercial activity is often the most
critical question in these inquiries because the commercial activity is
the jurisdictional hook—without it, a plaintiff cannot establish a U.S.
federal court’s power over a foreign-state defendant.
It is worth noting that the commercial nexus inquiry related to
the expropriation exception is distinct from the commercial activity
exception of the FSIA.70 The commercial activity exception of the FSIA
concerns the level of commercial behavior necessary to waive immunity
for a foreign sovereign that engages in business in the United States,
whereas the commercial nexus inquiry of the expropriation exception is
tailored to the context of takings in violation of international law.71
While there would seem to be overlap between the two exceptions on
the question of commercial activity, the expropriation exception
controls when a foreign country, instrumentality, or agency engages in
an illegal taking.72 The FSIA does not define what a taking is but “the
provision was intended to refer to the nationalization or expropriation
of property by a foreign sovereign without payment of prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation as required by international
law.”73

67. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 967–69 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d on other
grounds, 514 U.S. 677 (2004).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2012).
69. de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1104–08; Garb v. Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d 579, 589 (2d Cir.
2006); Altmann, 317 F.3d at 958.
70. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (the commercial activity exception), with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(3) (the expropriation exception).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)–(3).
72. Id.
73. Stewart, supra note 45, at 56.
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This area of law demonstrates the perennial tension between
justice and practicality. There is clearly a morally desirable result
here—these victims should get their day in court and the opportunity
to argue on the merits. This is also a scenario, however, in which the
most just result may not be the best one due to practical constraints,
such as foreign policy concerns.
II. THE JURISDICTION CONUNDRUM: HOW THE CIRCUITS DISAGREE ON
INTERPRETING THE EXPROPRIATION EXCEPTION
A. The D.C. and Second Circuits: The Alternative Threshold Approach
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and the Second
Circuit maintain that the expropriation exception sets up two separate
jurisdictional requirements—and thus two alternative thresholds—for
foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities.74 The D.C.
Circuit has considered this issue at length, while the Second Circuit has
not expanded on why it chose to interpret § 1605(a)(3) as establishing
two different jurisdictional requirements.75 Because the Second Circuit
has not specified why it adheres to the alternative threshold approach,
this Note uses the D.C. Circuit’s analysis as representative of the
argument in favor of two separate jurisdictional requirements.
The D.C. Circuit did not always follow the alternative threshold
approach.76 Before the de Csepel case, the precedent on this issue was
unclear at best—prior D.C. Circuit cases Simon v. Republic of Hungary
and Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Federation conflicted on how
to interpret the expropriation exception.77 In Simon, the court
interpreted the expropriation exception as having separate
requirements for jurisdiction for a nation-state and its agencies or

74. de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1104–08; Garb, 440 F.3d at 589.
75. The Second Circuit used the alternative threshold approach in Garb v. Republic of
Poland, holding that satisfying the expropriation exception’s second commercial activity nexus
requirement was insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the foreign state itself, but rather just the
agency or instrumentality at issue. 440 F.3d at 589 (“The first of these alternative showings sets
a higher threshold of proof for suing foreign states in connection with alleged takings by requiring
that the property at issue be ‘present in the United States.’ ”). The court, in deciding that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(3) established alternative thresholds, failed to support its conclusion with a
comprehensive analysis. See id. (failing to elucidate why alternative thresholds existed in 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)).
76. See Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812 F.3d 127, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining that
agencies and instrumentalities and foreign states had different requirement for jurisdiction to
attach based on the expropriation exception); Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian
Federation, 528 F.3d 934, 947–48, 955 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (declining to distinguish between
requirements for foreign states, agencies, and instrumentalities in conferring jurisdiction).
77. Simon, 812 F.3d at 146; Chabad, 528 F.3d at 947–48, 955.
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instrumentalities.78 But in Chabad, the D.C. Circuit did not distinguish
between foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities and
permitted suit based on the satisfaction of the second commercial
activity nexus alone.79 This discrepancy is an important demonstration
of the lower courts’ confusion on how to resolve this issue.
The de Csepel case provided the D.C. Circuit with the
opportunity to settle this conflicting precedent.80 The plaintiffs in de
Csepel favored the lower bar established by Chabad, while Hungary
argued that Simon was the controlling precedent.81 To resolve this
conflict, the court read the Chabad case as failing to hold one way or
the other on this issue, making Simon, which was quite clear about the
distinction, the binding precedent.82 According to the court, the Chabad
decision had “no precedential effect” because it was a “cursory and
unexamined . . . drive-by jurisdictional ruling[ ].”83
The de Csepel court very clearly held that for a U.S. court to
obtain jurisdiction over a foreign state, the property at issue must be
both (1) present in the United States and (2) used for a commercial
activity carried on in the United States.84 The D.C. Circuit reads the
expropriation exception as permitting a more lenient approach to the
jurisdictional requirements for agencies and instrumentalities—
requiring neither that the property be in the United States nor that the
commercial activity in the United States relates to the property.85
Agencies and instrumentalities must only satisfy the second
commercial activity nexus of the exception.
For example, under the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation, if a
plaintiff sues to return a family artifact displayed in a foreign nation’s
state-owned museum, the artifact is obviously not in the United States,
so jurisdiction over a foreign state will not attach under the first
commercial activity nexus.86 But if the state-owned museum sells
books, posters, or other souvenirs in the United States, then the second

78. See de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1107 (“[E]ven were we not bound by Simon, we would hold that
a foreign state retains its immunity unless the first clause of the commercial-activity nexus
requirement is met.”).
79. Chabad, 528 F.3d at 947–48, 955.
80. de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1104–08.
81. Id. at 1104–05.
82. Id. at 1105 (“The precise question, then, is whether the Chabad court held that a foreign
state loses immunity if the second nexus requirement is met. We think it did not.”); D.C. Circuit
Interprets, supra note 56, at 653.
83. de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1106 (alteration in original) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1107.
86. See id. (explaining the D.C. Circuit’s theory of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)’s application).
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commercial activity nexus of the expropriation exception is satisfied.87
It does not matter whether the specific artifact at issue is related to the
domestic sale of souvenirs—the state-owned museum’s commercial
activity in the United States is sufficient to gain jurisdiction over the
state-owned museum as an agency or instrumentality.88 By contrast, if
the plaintiff wished to secure jurisdiction over the foreign nation as
well, she would need to demonstrate that the disputed artifact was in
fact present in the United States and the commercial activity in
question was related to the disputed artifact.89 For example, loaning the
disputed artwork for display in the United States would likely be
sufficient.90
Judge Randolph, the lone dissenter in de Csepel, considered
Simon’s separate jurisdictional requirements to be a mistake—an
oversight by the Simon court because it failed to realize that Chabad
was the controlling precedent on this issue.91 He suggested that the de
Csepel majority’s stressed reconciliation of Simon in light of Chabad
was an attempt to save face after judicial error,92 and he went to great
lengths to dismantle the reasoning behind the majority’s holding that
Simon was a correct interpretation of the law, rather than Chabad.93
B. The Ninth Circuit: The Either-Or Approach
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit does not differentiate between
foreign sovereigns and their agencies and instrumentalities for
jurisdictional purposes under the expropriation exception—thus, a
plaintiff can establish jurisdiction over both by satisfying the second
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 517 F. Supp. 2d 322, 332–33 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding
that contracting with American museums, receiving consideration for the art loan, and sending
employees to oversee the painting’s safe arrival were sufficient to establish a “commercial activity”
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)); Ingrid Wuerth, An Art Museum Amendment to the
Foreign
Sovereign
Immunities
Act,
LAWFARE
(Jan.
2,
2017,
12:48
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/art-museum-amendment-foreign-sovereign-immunities-act
[https://perma.cc/32WR-ZZTJ].
91. de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1114 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The
only reasonable explanation for Simon’s treatment of Chabad is that it made a mistake. The
majority’s decision in this case only compounds the error.”); cf. id. at 1107 (majority opinion)
(explaining that the plaintiffs in Simon raised the Chabad argument in their briefs so the court
was not “unaware” of the precedent).
92. Id. at 1114 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. See id. at 1113–14 (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996))
(outlining the court’s misinterpretation of Chabad’s analysis and describing how the court’s
selective interpretation of Chabad conflicts with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Seminole Tribe,
which stressed that “it is not only the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to
that result by which we are bound”).
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commercial activity nexus alone.94 A litigant can haul a foreign state
into a U.S. court when an agency or instrumentality owns the disputed
property and engages in commercial activity in the United States; thus,
under this interpretation, a litigant need only show that the second
commercial nexus is satisfied to confer jurisdiction on a foreign nation.95
Compared to the approach of the D.C. and Second Circuits, this
jurisdictional barrier is much less demanding.96 In both Cassirer v.
Kingdom of Spain and Altmann v. Republic of Austria, the Ninth
Circuit permitted the plaintiffs to sue foreign nations, relying solely on
the satisfaction of the second part of the commercial activity nexus
requirement of the expropriation exception.97 Notably, neither opinion
explained the courts’ reasoning behind permitting suit against the
relevant foreign sovereign.98 Rather, the Ninth Circuit accepted the
language of the expropriation exception without further exploration.99
The text was sufficiently clear for the Ninth Circuit—either prong is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction over a foreign nation.100
C. Dueling Approaches
Considerable debate exists about the proper interpretation of
the expropriation exception based on the statutory language of
§ 1605(a)(3).101 Both sides of this argument claim that their reading of

94. See Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1032–34, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010) (allowing
plaintiffs to sue Spain after satisfying the second prong of the expropriation exception); Altmann
v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 2002) (permitting suit against Austria to go
forward on a showing that the second prong was satisfied), aff’d on other grounds, 514 U.S. 677
(2004).
95. Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1032–34, 1037; Altmann, 317 F.3d at 958.
96. See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Garb v. Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d
579, 589 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining how the Second Circuit’s interpretation sets a higher standard
for the foreign state than the agency or instrumentality).
97. Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1032–34, 1037; Altmann, 317 F.3d at 958.
98. Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1032–34, 1037; Altmann, 317 F.3d at 958.
99. Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1032–34, 1037; Altmann, 317 F.3d at 958.
100. See Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1032–34, 1037; Altmann, 317 F.3d at 958.
101. For convenience, here is the relevant statutory language:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States in any case . . . (3) in which rights in property taken in violation
of international law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such
property is present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any property
exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of
the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity
in the United States;
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012).
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the FSIA is the most natural and logical,102 and both sides claim that a
contrary reading would lead to absurd results.103
1. The Alternative Threshold Approach’s Functionalism
Supporters of the D.C. Circuit’s alternative threshold
approach—that foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities
have separate jurisdictional requirements under the FSIA—contend
that this is the only logical reading of § 1605(a)(3).104 This approach
tracks other jurisdictional jurisprudence, which usually requires a
connection to the United States to impose jurisdiction on a foreign
corporate defendant.105 Jurisdiction over a foreign defendant will lie
only if that entity—not a separate entity—has engaged with or has
contacts with the United States.106 Furthermore, advocates of this
approach argue that the relationship between a subsidiary and parent
corporation is similar to that between a foreign state and its agencies

102. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 29, de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 139 S. Ct.
784 (2019) (mem.) (No. 17-1165), 2018 WL 1028055, at *29:
[The] text [of the FSIA] is unambiguous . . . . [I]t provides that a foreign entity lacks
immunity when (1) it is a foreign state, (2) rights in property taken in violation of
international law are in issue, and (3) the relevant property is owned or operated by an
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state that is engaged in commercial activity in
the United States;
Brief in Opposition at 31, de Csepel, 139 S. Ct. 784 (No. 17-1165), 2018 WL 2383591, at *31
(“Because neither the FSIA, its legislative history, nor case law support the ‘counter-textual’
reading advocated by Petitioners, review by this Court is not warranted.” (citation omitted)).
103. de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“To conclude that
the foreign state loses its immunity if either clause is satisfied would produce an anomalous result:
the court would have no jurisdiction over the agencies and instrumentalities that actually own or
operate the expropriated property.”); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 102, at 27–28
(“Congress could not have intended simultaneously to abrogate foreign states’ immunity to
expropriation suits and to create a giant loophole that could prevent adjudication of such claims.”).
104. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, de Csepel, 139 S. Ct. 784 (No. 171165), 2018 WL 6382956, at *11 [hereinafter United States Amicus Brief in de Csepel]:
That text and structure as a whole is most naturally read as establishing two distinct
tracks for obtaining jurisdiction, depending on the kind of entity whose immunity is at
stake. . . . On that understanding, an entity’s exposure to suit in U.S. courts depends
on the connection between the expropriated property and that entity’s own U.S.
commercial activities. A plaintiff thus cannot mix and match, using the looser ‘agency
or instrumentality’ standard to bootstrap jurisdiction over the foreign state itself.
105. See id.
If a private foreign museum engaged in commercial activity in the United States, for
example, then that activity would naturally be expected to provide a basis for suing that
museum on related claims in a U.S. court. But that activity would not ordinarily provide
a basis for using a separate corporate parent . . . .
(citations omitted).
106. Id. (citing J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 881 (2011) (plurality opinion)
and Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 887–88 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)).
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and instrumentalities.107 As courts have been reluctant to confer
jurisdiction automatically over the parent corporation simply because
its subsidiary has contacts in the United States, advocates argue that
the same logic should apply to the relationship between foreign states
and their agencies and instrumentalities.108
Additionally, proponents of this approach argue that separating
the jurisdictional requirements of § 1605(a)(3) honors the “well-worn
distinction between foreign states and agencies and instrumentalities”
in the FSIA.109 They assert that Congress enacted the FSIA against the
background principle that statutory codification of immunity standards
should protect international comity,110 which has since informed the
general rule that distinct government agencies and instrumentalities
should be treated separately from their sovereigns.111
Proponents also maintain that when Congress has deviated from
this background rule, it has been explicit about its intention.112 For
example, Congress was clear in erasing the distinction between states
and their agencies and instrumentalities to allow victims of statesponsored terrorism to collect on particular judgments.113 Conversely,
no such language appears in the expropriation exception.114 However,
this point belies the fact that Congress, in defining “foreign state,”
included agencies and instrumentalities as part of the definition—and
107. Id. at 11–12.
108. See id. (analogizing jurisdictional norms for corporations to those for foreign states).
109. Id. at 6 (quoting de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2017));
see also Lauren Bursey, Comment, They’re People Too: Why U.S. Courts Should Give Foreign
Agencies and Instrumentalities Due Process Rights Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA), 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 221, 230 (2016) (“FSIA recognizes the reality that agencies and
instrumentalities are entities separate from the government and, accordingly treat [sic] them
different [sic] than states.”).
110. See United States Amicus Brief in de Csepel, supra note 104, at 12:
The expectation that jurisdiction over a foreign entity depends on that entity’s own
contacts with the United States is particularly strong in the FSIA . . . . As this Court
has long recognized, “[d]ue respect for the actions taken by foreign sovereigns and for
principles of comity between nations” support a background rule “that government
instrumentalities established as juridical entities distinct and independent from their
sovereign should normally be treated as such.”
(quoting First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 626–27
(1983), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2012), as recognized in Rubin v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018)).
111. See id.
112. See id. at 14 (providing the example of Congress expressly deviating from the rule in 28
U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1)).
113. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1) (2012) and Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 823). Congress enacted
28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1), which provides a list of factors to consider when holding an agency or
instrumentality liable for the actions of a foreign sovereign. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1); Rubin, 138 S.
Ct. at 822–23. The default presumption is that foreign states and their agencies and
instrumentalities were separate legal entities. See Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 822.
114. United States Amicus Brief in de Csepel, supra note 104, at 14.
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that this definition was explicitly adopted for the expropriation
exception, arguably eviscerating the distinction between the two.115
The FSIA’s commercial activity exception also supports a
background principle that the FSIA should treat agencies and
instrumentalities differently from foreign sovereigns.116 As an example
of the careful distinction between foreign states and their agencies and
instrumentalities under the FSIA, supporters of this approach note that
a foreign nation loses immunity status under the commercial activity
exception only if the claim against the state—as opposed to the agency
or instrumentality—satisfies that exception.117 By analogy, they argue,
this logic should extend to the expropriation exception.118
Additionally, this alternative threshold approach would guard
against anomalous outcomes.119 The D.C. Circuit has explained:
To conclude that the foreign state loses its immunity if either clause is satisfied would
produce an anomalous result: the court would have no jurisdiction over the agencies and
instrumentalities that actually own or operate the expropriated property. That is because,
although the FSIA generally allows for “an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state”
to count as a “foreign state,” the agencies or instrumentalities would fail to
satisfy either of the expropriation exception’s two clauses if considered to be the relevant
“foreign state” throughout the exception. Take this case. The family would be unable to
pursue its claims against the very entities that actually possess the Herzog collection—
the museums and the university—because the collection is not “present in the United
States” (clause one) nor “owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality” of the
museums and the university (clause two). Thus, the expropriation exception’s two clauses
make sense only if they establish alternative thresholds a plaintiff must meet depending
on whether the plaintiff seeks to sue a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of
that state.120

Furthermore, in dissolving the distinction between foreign
states and their instrumentalities, the plaintiff would be able to sue a
foreign sovereign that engaged in no commercial activity in the United
115. See de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094, 1112 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Randolph,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining how the Act defines “foreign state” to
include agencies and instrumentalities).
116. See United States Amicus Brief in de Csepel, supra note 104, at 13 (“When applying other
FSIA exceptions to immunity from suit, the courts of appeals have consistently recognized that a
foreign state ‘does not lose immunity merely because one of its agencies and instrumentalities
satisfies an FSIA exception.’ ” (emphasis added)).
117. See de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1107 (majority opinion) (“For that reason, a foreign state loses
its immunity under the commercial-activity exception only if the claim against the state—as
opposed to the agency or instrumentality—satisfies that exception.”); United States Amicus Brief
in de Csepel, supra note 104, at 13 (“For example, under the FSIA’s commercial activity exception,
28 U.S.C. [§] 1605(a)(2), the courts of appeals have applied the presumption to hold that ‘a foreign
sovereign is not amenable to suit based upon the acts’ of an instrumentality, unless the Bancec
presumption is overcome.”).
118. See de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1107; United States Amicus Brief in de Csepel, supra note 104,
at 6.
119. See de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1107.
120. Id. at 1107–08 (citation omitted).
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States so long as the sovereign’s agency or instrumentality owning or
operating the property did.121 This result seems counterintuitive, as it
would be easier to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign state if it did not
own the property at issue, but rather one of its agencies and
instrumentalities did.122 Because the commercial activity bar is higher
for the first clause—requiring presence of property in the United States
and a commercial activity nexus to that property, as opposed to mere
commercial activity—a plaintiff could more easily sue a foreign-state
defendant by simply showing some level of commercial activity by an
agency or instrumentality.123
As advocates have noted, however, this argument falls flat in
certain factual scenarios—for example, in the case of the Herzogs, it is
not mere “happenstance” that their family’s prized paintings are in
Hungary’s state-owned museums.124 Though Hungary’s state-owned
museums possess the paintings, Hungary is one of the parties directly
responsible for their theft in the first place: after receiving the stolen
art from Nazi soldiers, Hungary put the loot on display.125 Holding
Hungary accountable for the actions of its agencies and
instrumentalities is not an odd or anomalous result under these facts.126
Still, the D.C. Circuit in de Csepel worried that this approach
would allow plaintiffs carte blanche to sue “any and all agencies and
instrumentalities of a foreign state however unconnected to the United
States,” as long as the foreign nation had possession of the property at
issue in connection with its commercial activity in the United States.127
2. The Either-Or Approach’s Clear-Eyed Reading
Meanwhile, proponents of the Ninth Circuit’s either-or
approach, which levies jurisdiction against a foreign state if either
prong is satisfied, argue that the first words of the statutory provision
121. Id. at 1108.
122. See id. (explaining this odd result and stating that the plaintiff “could sue any and all
agencies and instrumentalities of a foreign state however unconnected to the United States, so
long as the foreign state itself possesses the property in connection with a commercial
activity . . . in the United States”).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012).
124. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 10, de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2012)
(mem.) (No. 17-1165), 2018 WL 2684553, at *10.
125. Id.
126. See id. (“Hungary can reap the financial benefits that flow to the state-owned museums
through their affirmative marketing efforts in the United States. There is nothing unfair about
permitting the surviving members of the Herzog family to sue Hungary . . . .”).
127. de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1108; see United States Amicus Brief in de Csepel, supra note 104,
at 16 (“[I]t is very unlikely that Congress intended for jurisdiction to be ‘dispensed in gross . . . .’ ”
(citation omitted)).
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make this interpretation clear: “[A] foreign state shall not be immune
from suit.”128 To conclude otherwise would require reading the word
“not” out of the text129 or determining that the drafters of the FSIA
intended to confer an elevated status on the foreign state as compared
to its agencies and instrumentalities.130
Supporters of this approach also argue that this difference
between jurisdictional requirements for foreign states versus their
agencies and instrumentalities is not supported by the plain language
of the statute or the legislative history.131 Section 1603(a) of the FSIA
defines “foreign state” to include its agencies and instrumentalities,
which undercuts the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning that the agencies and
instrumentalities are totally severable from the foreign state itself.132
Further, the relevant House Report clearly adopts this definition to
apply to the expropriation exception.133
Advocates for the Ninth Circuit’s either-or approach also assert
that the reliance on nebulous “background” principles supporting a
distinction between foreign states and their instrumentalities in the
FSIA is incorrect.134 Congress enacted the FSIA to replace these
background rules and codify a specific, discrete standard by which
foreign sovereign immunity attaches.135
128. de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1111 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)). Judge Randolph did not mince words. Id. at 1110 (“[T]he majority’s
opinion transforms the governing jurisdictional statute to mean the opposite of what it says.”).
129. Id. at 1111 (“Although § 1605(a)(3) provides that a foreign state shall not be immune from
suit, the majority crosses out the ‘not’ and holds that the foreign state shall be immune when its
agencies or instrumentalities owning or operating the expropriated property engage in commercial
activity in the United States.”).
130. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 124, at 7 (“Hungary extrapolates from those
provisions a free-floating principle that a foreign sovereign should always be afforded more
favorable treatment under the FSIA than its agencies or instrumentalities, even when the FSIA
provides otherwise.”).
131. See de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1112 n.1 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“This supposed neat distinction between foreign states and their instrumentalities is belied
not only by the Act defining ‘foreign state’ to include agencies and instrumentalities, . . . but also
by the House Report on the Act explicitly adopting this definition for the expropriation exception.”
(citation omitted)).
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2012) (“A ‘foreign state’, except as used in section 1608 of this title,
includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state . . . .”); see de Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1112 n.1 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (explaining that the expropriation exception includes agencies and instrumentalities in its
definition of “foreign state”).
133. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 18–19 (1976) (“Section 1605 sets forth the general
circumstances in which a claim of sovereign immunity by a foreign state, as defined in section
1603(a), would not be recognized in a Federal or State court in the United States.”); see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(a) (“A ‘foreign state’, except as used in section 1608 of this title, includes a political
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state . . . .”).
134. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 124, at 8.
135. Id.

5_Tenkhoff (Do Not Delete)

2020]

HOLOCAUST-ERA ART RESTITUTION

3/13/2020 2:29 PM

589

Reading the exception to establish different jurisdictional
thresholds might also lead to odd results.136 For example, in the de
Csepel case, defendant Hungary argued that it could not possibly be
subject to jurisdiction under the FSIA’s expropriation exception because
the property was in Hungary, not the United States, and it had not
engaged in commercial activities in connection with the property at
issue, thus failing the first prong of § 1605(a)(3).137 However, once the
D.C. Circuit ordered the trial court to dismiss Hungary as a
defendant,138 the remaining defendants (the agencies and
instrumentalities) argued that the case could not go further because
Hungary was a “necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
19.”139 The defendants argued there was no available relief for the
Herzog family unless Hungary was a party, as Hungary owned the
property at issue and was the party that committed the
expropriation.140 While the district court has yet to rule on the
defendants’ Rule 19 argument,141 it seems unlikely that Congress
intended the expropriation exception to create such an escape clause for
foreign states to evade jurisdiction.142
Additionally, the alternative threshold approach’s reading of
§ 1605(a)(3) makes the expropriation exception ineffective as it relates
to foreign states.143 To avoid jurisdiction under the alternative
threshold approach, foreign states need only abstain from sending the
property to the United States for a commercial activity.144 This
effectively quashes any chance for a plaintiff to gain jurisdiction over a
foreign sovereign in an art suit because foreign states, cognizant of this
jurisdictional prerequisite, will simply avoid bringing the property to
the United States.145
136. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 102, at 27–28.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 27.
139. Id. at 28.
140. Id. at 27–28.
141. See de Csepel et al v. Republic of Hungary et al Court Docket Sheet, DOCKETBIRD,
https://www.docketbird.com/court-cases/De-Csepel-et-al-v-Republic-of-Hungary-et-al/dcd-1:2010cv-01261 [https://perma.cc/3DJD-PP9X] (showing that the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on
their Rule 19 argument on February 9, 2018, but the court has yet to issue an order on the merits
of that argument).
142. Id. at 28.
143. See id. at 31 (“The panel majority’s interpretation thus renders toothless a provision that
purports to remove a foreign state’s immunity—based on a contorted view of the term ‘foreign
state’ that excludes foreign states. Congress could not have intended that bizarre result.”).
144. Id. (“[U]nder the D.C. Circuit’s erroneous interpretation of the expropriation exception, a
foreign state could retain its immunity to suit merely by refraining from bringing the expropriated
property . . . to the United States in connection with a commercial activity.”).
145. See id. (explaining that foreign states may easily avoid jurisdiction by keeping the art out
of the United States).
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D. Practical Effects
The resolution of this circuit split will likely have broader
implications than simply plaintiffs’ ability to sue in U.S. courts. In fact,
a resolution favoring less immunity and more court access could lead to
tensions between foreign sovereigns and the United States.146 Through
the FSIA, Congress attempted to prevent immunity blunders with other
countries,147 and an either-or approach to the expropriation exception
could undercut this goal because it would permit a district court to
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign-state defendant more freely. A U.S.
court exercising jurisdiction over a foreign nation is a delicate matter,
and international comity demands some degree of deference to other
states.148 The narrow interpretations of other FSIA exceptions and the
establishment of the FSIA as the exclusive means for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state animate these concerns.149 The
distinction between a foreign state and its agencies and
instrumentalities demonstrates the desire for parity between nations
that is carefully enshrined in the FSIA.150
Further, a more liberal approach to jurisdiction in Nazi-era loot
cases will likely discourage the exchange of culturally significant
artwork between countries.151 Foreign nations are already wary of
loaning their artwork to the United States as they fear it will lead to
lawsuits for disputed pieces. Russia, for example, has stopped loaning

146. See Brief for Amicus Curiae the United States at 17, Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812
F.3d 127 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 17-7146), 2018 WL 2461996, at *17 [hereinafter United States
Amicus Brief in Simon] (“[When] the United States has expressed its foreign policy interests in
connection with a particular subject matter or litigation, a court should give substantial weight to
the United States’ views that those interests support (or weigh against) abstention in favor of a
foreign forum that can resolve the dispute.”). The preceding quote specifically speaks to the
doctrine of forum non conveniens as it relates to international comity, but the principles also apply
to why a court may decide to more narrowly interpret jurisdictional requirements.
147. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 320.
148. See id. at 320 (discussing the dissatisfaction with the immunity determination process
pre–FSIA).
149. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816, 822 (2018) (“Congress enacted the
FSIA in an effort to codify this careful balance between respecting the immunity historically
afforded to foreign sovereigns and holding them accountable, in certain circumstances, for their
actions.”).
150. See id. (“ ‘For the most part, the Act’ tracks ‘the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity.’ ” (quoting Verlinden V.B. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983))).
151. See Wuerth, supra note 90 (discussing the Art Museum Amendment to the FSIA, also
known as The Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act or FCEJCA,
which provides that artwork loaned to the United States for temporary display falls outside the
meaning of “commercial activity,” and therefore outside of the expropriation exception in the FSIA,
to facilitate the exchange of artwork between nations).
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artwork to the United States altogether.152 To ameliorate this concern
and facilitate art exchange, Congress passed the Foreign Cultural
Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act (“FCEJCA”) to
amend the FSIA. The FCEJCA authorizes the president to designate
foreign states’ exhibition of artwork in the United States as outside of
the scope of the “commercial activity” categorization under certain
circumstances.153 The president is not entitled to make such a
designation for works subject to “Nazi-era claims,” however, leaving
foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities vulnerable to
claims like the Herzogs’.154
The denial of jurisdiction in U.S. courts may reflect the desire to
protect the United States from judicial interference abroad.155 The Tate
Letter explained this goal and cited reciprocity as a primary motive in
adopting the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.156 Because other
states failed to extend immunity to the United States in their own
courts, Tate argued that the United States should not extend this
immunity to other governments in domestic courts.157 This argument
goes both ways—if the United States wants to remain immune abroad
for expropriation suits, it would do well to offer the same immunity to
foreign nations in U.S. courts. Perhaps the reason the United States is
not keen to extend jurisdiction in the context of expropriations is the
recognition that this would make the United States vulnerable to
jurisdiction for these types of acts in other nations. The United States
would be justified in fearing a quid pro quo retaliation of this sort but,
in turn, it would relinquish its moral authority.
Failure to exercise jurisdiction over foreign states in Nazi-era
art suits arguably undermines the consensus established by the
international community in previous international agreements.158 In
the decades following the Holocaust, nations, nongovernmental
152. Id. (“The [Malewicz] case had a ripple effect in the art world. Foreign states rescinded or
refused to temporarily loan art to museums in the U.S. for fear of being sued.”).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 319–20 (“[T]he granting of sovereign immunity to
foreign governments in the courts of the United States is most inconsistent with the action of the
Government of the United States in subjecting itself to suit in these same courts in both contract
and tort . . . .” (quoting Tate Letter, supra note 36, at 984)).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 15, de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019) (mem.)
(No. 17-1165), 2018 WL 1470233, at *15 [hereinafter Eizenstat Brief] (“[The D.C. Circuit’s decision]
is inconsistent with the broad international consensus reflected in the multilateral
declarations . . . that States play a key role in facilitating just and fair solutions for victims of
Holocaust-era expropriation.”).
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organizations, and advocacy groups have made a global push to
facilitate art restitution for victims—the United States and multiple
former Nazi-aligned countries have signed various declarations and
agreements claiming steadfast support for victims.159 For example, the
Washington Conference Principles implored that nations aid the effort
to return stolen artworks by identifying these stolen works and making
that information public.160 These instruments, though not legally
binding, make clear that states shoulder substantial responsibility to
rectify these wrongs.161 To hold otherwise would belie decades of
international progress.162
Additionally, the alternative threshold approach bypasses some
of the practical realities of enforcing judgments against agencies and
instrumentalities of foreign governments.163 Agencies and
instrumentalities may be able to avoid execution of judgments more
easily by keeping an insufficient number of assets in the United States,
effectively making them judgment proof.164 This would make it
extremely difficult for plaintiffs to enforce their awards;165 of course, on
the other hand, a foreign-state defendant could employ the same
strategy. Nevertheless, without a U.S. forum, aggrieved plaintiffs
would be forced to pursue recourse in the defendant country, which can
often lead to a long slog of procedural hurdles and likely a “home court
advantage” for the foreign-state defendant in the foreign forum.166 The
159. Id. at 9–11 (listing the international agreements affirming support and restitution for
Holocaust survivors like the Washington Conference Principles, the Vilnius Forum Declaration,
and the Terezin Declaration on Holocaust Era Assets and Related Issues).
160. Paulina McCarter Collins, Comment, Has “The Lost Museum” Been Found?
Declassification of Government Documents and Report on Holocaust Assets Offer Real Opportunity
to “Do Justice” for Holocaust Victims on the Issue of Nazi-Looted Art, 54 ME. L. REV. 115, 141
(2002).
161. See Eizenstat Brief, supra note 158, at 9 (“Although such declarations are not legally
enforceable, this declaration [the Washington Conference Principles] and those that followed
reflect the recognition by the signatories of the responsibilities that States bear in the process of
returning artworks to their rightful owners.”).
162. See id. at 7 (“For decades, the U.S. government has lent the weight of its authority, and
considerable resources, to urging foreign States to help bring justice to victims of the Holocaust
and their heirs.”).
163. See id. at 17 (“[T]he participation of foreign sovereigns is vital to . . . resolving these
claims. The decision below . . . would deprive claimants of an important mechanism for holding
foreign States accountable for restoring to the claimants their property that was expropriated as
part of Nazi-era crimes.”).
164. See id. at 24–25 (“[A]s a practical matter, agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign State
may not have sufficient assets in the United States that are subject to attachment to satisfy a
judgment . . . .”).
165. See id. at 25 (“[A]gencies or instrumentalities can more readily avoid the execution of
judgments than can foreign States themselves, thus frustrating attempts to achieve a measure of
justice.”).
166. For example, the State Department’s 2018 Hungary Human Rights Report noted an
increased number of “reports of political pressure on judges by senior members of the government.”
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Altmann and de Csepel litigations are instructive on this point. Before
Maria Altmann attempted to sue in the United States, she pursued her
claims in Austria, where the art restitution committee refused to return
her stolen works.167 Thereafter, she attempted to sue in Austrian court,
but was told that to pursue her claims she would have to put down 1.2
percent of the estimated value of her award (plus 13,180 Austrian
schillings168)—the amount in controversy was $135 million.169 She
would have had to pay $1.6 million to get into court.170 Because of the
prohibitive cost of the effort, she dropped the lawsuit in Austria and
sued in the United States.171 Likewise, after the Herzogs initially won
the return of eleven pieces in Hungary, an appellate court reversed the
decision.172 Twelve years after Hungary failed to follow through on its
commitment to appoint a state commissioner to investigate the claims
of Holocaust victims—a promise it made at the Washington
Conference—the Herzogs brought suit in the United States.173
Further, applying the alternative threshold approach in Naziera looted art cases does not account for the U.S. government’s
expressed interest in art restitution for Holocaust victims and their
descendants domestically.174 For example, under the FCEJCA—
enacted to facilitate art exhibition in the United States175—the
president is not entitled to waive the expropriation exception for works
subject to “Nazi-era claims.”176 To the extent this and other
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, HUNGARY 2018 HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORT 7 (2018), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/hungary-2018human-rights-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AFU-UPGM]. Where the defendant is the foreign state
itself, one can imagine that the pressure on the judiciary would not be insignificant.
167. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d on other grounds,
514 U.S. 677 (2004).
168. In today’s dollars, that would amount to about $1,036. Austrian schilling (ATS) to US
dollar (USD) Converter, MATAF.NET, https://www.mataf.net/en/currency/converter-ATSUSD?m1=13180 (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5UHX-DPC4].
169. Altmann, 317 F.3d at 961.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. O’DONNELL, supra note 3, at 258–59.
173. Id. at 259.
174. Eizenstat Brief, supra note 158, at 12–13:
The U.S. government undertook a number of measures to put the Washington
Conference Principles into practice. It encouraged its private museums and the
National Gallery of Art to return Nazi-looted art in their collection, and worked with
the U.S. art museum directors association as the U.S. museums investigated the
provenance of their art collections in the search for Nazi-looted art.
175. Id. at 13–14 (“[The FCEJCA] provides that the temporary exhibition in the United States
of artworks owned by a foreign State is not ‘commercial activity’ by that State . . . if the President
determines in advance that the work is of ‘cultural significance’ and the display of the work is in
the ‘national interest.’ ”).
176. Id. at 14.
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congressional initiatives show that Congress intended to encourage the
return of looted art, it buttresses the theory that Congress would
support more initiatives to facilitate the return of this stolen
property.177
The price for an approach that is the most sensitive to
international comity concerns is access foreclosure—the alternative
threshold approach will unquestionably prevent litigants from bringing
their claims in the United States.178 Further, research suggests that
access denial in the forum state can bar claims in another country’s
judicial system.179 This problem is especially acute when the litigant is
a U.S. citizen, since one of the stated purposes of the FSIA was to
provide a forum for aggrieved plaintiffs.180 The alternative threshold
approach effectively creates a “how-to manual for foreign states to
deprive expropriation victims of the U.S. judicial forum provided by
Congress.”181
Supporters of the alternative threshold approach counter that
the United States should not serve as a forum for all Nazi-era looted art
claims—victims and states are better served by litigating where the
alleged theft took place because the foreign forum will likely have better
access to relevant evidence and witnesses.182 The United States is not
the world’s courtroom, nor does its judiciary have the resources to act
177. See id. at 12–14 (describing the U.S. government’s efforts to support the notion that
Congress favors restitution for Holocaust victims); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 102,
at 25 (“Congress has enacted multiple laws intended to remove remaining obstacles to the just
resolution of those claims.”).
178. Take the plaintiffs in the de Csepel action—the denial of certiorari ensures they will not
be able to bring a claim against Hungary.
179. Christopher A. Whytock, Foreign State Immunity and the Right to Court Access, 93 B.U.
L. REV. 2033, 2076–77 (2013):
Nevertheless, it appears that in many cases in which a U.S. court denies court access
on foreign state immunity grounds, the foreign state lacks robust judicial independence
or rule of law according to a variety of measures, and may therefore fail to provide a
meaningful alternative forum for the plaintiff’s claim against the foreign state. In such
circumstances, a decision to deny U.S. court access may be tantamount to a decision to
deny meaningful court access altogether.
180. See id. at 2071:
Denial of court access [based on foreign-state immunity] is especially serious when it
occurs in the [plaintiff’s] home country. In such a case, the very government that
demands loyalty from, and thus owes protection to, the plaintiff, refuses to assist him
in the vindication of his . . . rights.
(alterations in original) (quoting Mathias Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign
Immunity: Some Thoughts on Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 403, 419
(1995)).
181. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 124, at 9.
182. See United States Amicus Brief in Simon, supra note 146, at 25–26 (discussing how forum
non conveniens helps identify cases that should be litigated in a different forum). Though this brief
does not discuss these concerns in the context of the expropriation exception issue discussed in
this Note, its points are still instructive.
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as such.183 But for families like the Herzogs, who have tried and failed
to pursue recourse in a foreign state, the United States may be the only
option.184 However, as noted in Part IV, there are other ways for the
U.S. government to help resolve these claims without the federal
judiciary.185
III. BEYOND NAZI-ERA LOOTED ART CLAIMS: FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT
The expropriation exception, while a major conduit for Nazi-era
art looting suits, is not cabined to these claims.186 Taking a closer look
at the other types of claims that fall within FSIA’s expropriation
exception—specifically foreign direct investment—demonstrates why
Nazi-looted art plaintiffs face unique challenges in their pursuit of
relief. And why, as a result, their claims might need more creative
thinking to effectuate that relief.
The typical foreign direct investment suit occurs when a foreign
state illegally187 nationalizes or appropriates the property of a company
operating in that foreign state. If this happens, the affected company
can bring suit under the expropriation exception.188 Recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence demonstrates the Court’s reluctance to permit
broad access to U.S. courts for these types of claims.189 In Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co.,
the Court rejected the D.C. Circuit’s liberal interpretation of the
pleading standard for a taking in violation of international law,
concluding that it was not sufficient merely to present a nonfrivolous
argument that a taking occurred.190 Rather, the plaintiff must show,
“(and not just arguably show) a taking of property in violation of
international law.”191 Put another way, courts will not accept a “party’s
nonfrivolous, but ultimately incorrect, argument that property was
taken in violation of international law” as enough to confer
183. See id. at 26 (litigating in the foreign forum could avoid “years of litigation over
jurisdictional issues”).
184. See O’DONNELL, supra note 3, at 345 (“[I]t may well be that a wavering commitment to
the Washington Principles means that litigation in America will increase.”).
185. See infra Part IV.
186. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012) (containing no
language that limits expropriation claims to Nazi-loot suits).
187. The taking must violate international law in some way. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct.
1312, 1324 (2017) (rejecting a lower pleading standard for expropriation claims thus limiting which
claims can proceed to the merits).
190. Id.
191. Id. See supra Section I.C (explaining what “taking” means under the FSIA).
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jurisdiction.192 While this is not directly related to the issue at hand,
this holding demonstrates the Court’s willingness to narrow the scope
of claims that fall under the expropriation exception.193
The Ninth Circuit’s either-or approach would increase U.S. court
access for U.S. businesses whose property was appropriated by foreign
governments abroad.194 This raises the same international comity and
judicial efficiency concerns noted above; however, suits arising out of
Nazi-era stolen art claims and those emerging from expropriated
business property claims are worth distinguishing. As it stands, Nazilooted art plaintiffs have limited effective options for favorably
resolving their claims.
Historically, investors whose property had been expropriated by
a foreign state had little recourse.195 Individuals could not file suits
against foreign states, so they were forced to rely on their home state to
espouse the claim on their behalf.196 Home states often declined to
pursue action for fear of damaging their foreign policy goals.197 If a
foreign government took their property, the companies were left with
few avenues for restitution.198 The expropriation exception of the FSIA
ameliorates these concerns to a degree, allowing companies to sue
foreign states for takings.199 However, modern investment treaties offer
an even more appealing resolution mechanism—arbitration.200
Many companies pursue their claims under the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes’ (“ICSID”) rules, though
this is not the exclusive means of arbitration.201 Arbitration offers a
favorable alternative to traditional litigation for many reasons: private
parties can initiate the proceedings (sovereigns cannot), investors can
choose the “forum, timing, rules, and legal issues that get litigated”;202
parties appoint the arbitrators;203 and financial awards are not

192. Helmerich, 137 S. Ct. at 1316.
193. See id. at 1318–22 (analyzing the pleading standard for expropriation claims in the
context of the FSIA’s history and objectives).
194. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 102, at 26 (“Although this case highlights
the importance of the question presented to Holocaust survivors and their heirs, the issue is also
important to U.S. businesses that have property or otherwise do business abroad.”).
195. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 694.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See id. (outlining how an investor could be stonewalled in pursuing legal action).
199. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012).
200. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 694, 707–08.
201. Id. at 694.
202. Id. at 707.
203. Id. at 708 (“[C]ritics note that some individuals are virtually always appointed as
arbitrator by claimants, that others are virtually always selected by states, and that virtually all
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appealable.204 In fact, the terms of arbitration are so favorable to
investors that some countries have opted not to participate in
arbitration for such claims at all.205
In contrast, victims of Nazi looting may have no viable
alternative for pursuing their claims.206 The many attempted initiatives
to compensate survivors fall short. For example, under the
International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, one of the Herzog heirs,
Erzsebét Weiss de Csepel, filed a claim with the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission to receive a payout for nationalized real
property and twelve paintings in the family’s collection.207 She was
awarded $210,000—less than one percent of the $100 million figure that
the heirs now claim they are owed.208 Moreover, in 1973, Hungary
concluded an executive agreement with the United States providing an
$18.9 million lump sum to settle all claims by U.S. nationals against
Hungary.209 The plaintiffs in the de Csepel case understandably would
not want to pursue relief through this mechanism. First, their claims
are much more valuable than the expected payout—the de Csepel
plaintiffs’ claims alone amount to $100 million, more than five times
what the fund was established to hold. Second, the agreements create
limited process for the plaintiffs—there is simply a monetary payout;
the 1973 Agreement provides no means for securing the return of looted
art. Third, as the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
explained, this agreement is nonbinding on plaintiffs who were not U.S.
citizens during the Holocaust.210 Thus, as many Holocaust survivors did
not move to the United States to become citizens until after the
Holocaust, they were not required to utilize this agreement for a payout
dissents written by party-appointed arbitrators are written in favor of the party who appointed
them.”).
204. Id. at 704 (“Under the 1965 treaty creating ICSID, domestic courts do not have authority
to stay, compel, or review ICSID tribunals. At the same time, ICSID provides a limited mechanism
for challenging awards.”).
205. Id. at 708:
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have withdrawn from the ICSID Convention. Others
announced plans to limit or eliminate their exposure to ISDS [investor-state dispute
settlement]. For example, in 2011, the Australian government announced that it would
not include ISDS in future BITs [bilateral investment treaties] and regional trade
agreements . . . .
206. See Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Reconciling Individual and Group Justice with the Need for
Repose in Nazi-Looted Art Disputes, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 155, 165–66 (2007) (explaining how the
myriad of restitution mechanisms available to Holocaust survivors do not cover looted art).
207. de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 808 F. Supp. 2d 113, 124 (D.D.C. 2011).
208. Id.
209. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic Regarding the Settlement of Claims, Hung.-U.S.,
Mar. 6, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 522.
210. de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 169 F. Supp. 3d 143, 167 (D.D.C. 2016).
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and had little incentive to do so. Fourth, the 1973 Agreement’s claims
payout process was completed in 1977—even if the Herzog heirs wanted
to file claims through this Agreement, they would not be able to.211
Plaintiffs can also pursue recourse in the country where their
art was taken, but critics say these European commissions on
restitution are known for stonewalling, a lack of transparency, and
foregone conclusions.212 When it first began its work, Austria’s art
restitution commission was “synonymous with a lack of transparency
and predetermined outcomes.”213 Likewise, Germany’s art commission
is criticized for not hearing enough cases and establishing a slow
process that requires both parties to consent to the forum.214
Some countries do not have any organized restitution
commission at all—Hungary, for example, has no historical commission
to investigate Hungary’s role in art theft, nor has it initiated any
research into the provenance of the art in its museums.215 There is no
international tribunal dedicated to resolving these disputes, though
commentators have called for one.216 Weighed against the possibility
that these looted art plaintiffs have no avenue for restitution,
international comity and judicial administration concerns seem to
shrink, especially when compared to the litigation alternatives
available to U.S. businesses.
Further, while the appropriation of U.S. business property is
certainly of paramount concern, Nazi-era art looting claims are, quite
frankly, materially different. The need for justice in the realm of Nazilooted art is more acute—foreign governments perpetrated these
takings in pursuit of the systematic annihilation of an entire people.217
211. Completed Programs—Hungary, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, (July 28, 2014), www.justice.gov
/fcsc/completed-programs-hungary [https://perma.cc/K8ST-HFFX].
212. O’ DONNELL, supra note 3, at 310–11.
213. Id. Not all commissions are universally derided; in recent years, many have commended
the Austrian Art Restitution Advisory Board for its meticulous work. Id. at 311.
214. Catherine Hickley, Washington Principles: The Restitution of Nazi-Looted Art Is Still a
Work in Progress, 20 Years on, ART NEWSPAPER (Nov. 26, 2018, 10:47 BST),
https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/restitution-of-nazi-looted-art-a-work-in-progress
[https://perma.cc/FB7F-FVDJ].
215. O’DONNELL, supra note 3, at 344 (quoting Wesley A. Fisher & Ruth Weinberger,
Holocaust-Era Looted Art: A Current World-Wide View, WORLD JEWISH RESTITUTION ORG.,
http://art.claimscon.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Worldwide-Overview.pdf (last updated Nov.
13, 2014) [https://perma.cc/9PVN-DSJ8]) (“While a few restitutions have taken place, important
works of art have consistently been kept from being restituted to their rightful owners.”)).
216. See Kreder, supra note 206, at 156–57 (proposing the creation of “an international
tribunal with compulsory jurisdiction to resolve all such disputes and clear title to artwork”);
Benjamin E. Pollock, Comment, Out of the Night and Fog: Permitting Litigation to Prompt an
International Resolution to Nazi-Looted Art Claims, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 193, 230 (2006).
217. See Art Stolen by the Nazis, supra note 2 (“During World War II, the Nazis looted some
600,000 paintings from Jews, at least 100,000 of which are still missing. The looting was not only
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The alleged crimes are especially heinous, making the need for relief all
the more pressing.
IV. A WAY FORWARD: EXECUTIVE BRANCH ACTION TO HELP
REMEDIATE NAZI-LOOTED ART CLAIMS
The executive branch should work with former Nazi-aligned
regimes to conclude a series of executive agreements that provide relief
for Holocaust survivors and their descendants seeking the return of
looted art.
Both foreign sovereigns and plaintiffs would benefit from
executive branch action providing another way forward. As it stands,
jurisdiction over foreign states depends on the circuit in which they are
sued, which undercuts the purpose of the FSIA and helps neither the
victims nor the foreign states they seek to hold accountable. The
Supreme Court declined to grant the de Csepel petition for writ of
certiorari,218 so a definitive judicial solution is neither imminent nor
guaranteed. And these types of claims will not go away.219 Moreover,
the possibility of congressional action on this issue is very unlikely—
while Congress has indeed signaled a willingness to legislate in the
areas of Nazi-looted art claims, the expropriation exception is not
cabined to these types of claims. It covers other suits for stolen
property,220 which could be affected by a congressional attempt to clarify
the statutory language of the FSIA. Any congressional action to expand
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns would come with weighty foreign
policy considerations, while any attempt to limit jurisdiction in this
area could yield political consequences amongst people rightfully
sympathetic to the survivors’ plight. Even more importantly, the last
time Congress attempted to lower a jurisdictional threshold against a
foreign state, President Obama vetoed it (though Congress overrode the
President’s veto and the legislation still passed).221 Here, where

designed to enrich the Third Reich but also integral to the Holocaust’s goal of eliminating all
vestiges of Jewish identity and culture.”).
218. de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
219. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 102, at 25 (“Nor is there anything to
suggest that Holocaust-era expropriation claims will soon fade away. To the contrary, decades of
significant obstacles to resolving such claims have ensured that the opposite is true.”).
220. See supra Part III.
221. Jennifer Steinhauer, Mark Mazzetti & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Congress Votes to Override
Obama
Veto
on
9/11
Victims
Bill,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
28,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/us/politics/senate-votes-to-override-obama-veto-on-9-11victims-bill.html [https://perma.cc/8DAJ-Z37Y]; Seung Min Kim, Obama Vetoes Saudi 9/11 Bill,
POLITICO (Sept. 23, 2016, 5:35 PM EDT), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/obama-jasta228548 [https://perma.cc/9RUQ-U2RL].
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permitting jurisdiction against former Nazi regimes would likely anger
modern-day allies, such as Germany, a presidential veto seems likely.
If Congress were to enact a statute allowing for federal court
jurisdiction over former Nazi-aligned regimes for expropriation claims,
it would arguably be a violation of international law as understood by
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in Germany v. Italy.222 There,
the ICJ held that allowing suit against Germany in Italian courts for
jus cogens violations—international law norms that cannot be
derogated from—contravened customary international law norms that
granted immunity to foreign sovereigns.223 The grant of immunity has
nothing to do with the underlying allegations but rather the identity of
the actor being sued—and courts across the world rejected the jus
cogens argument as a justification for waiving immunity.224
Rather than wait for the Supreme Court or Congress to act, the
executive branch can—and should—do what it does best: conduct the
business of foreign relations. The President and the State Department
should work to design a series of executive agreements with former
Nazi-aligned regimes to reduce the threat of litigation in the U.S.
federal court system. The executive agreements should be two-fold.
First, in exchange for agreeing to enter arbitration with potential U.S.
art claimants and neutral arbitrators, the U.S. government would
pledge to file briefs in cases where these foreign sovereigns were
defendants. Those briefs would explain that it is in the United States’
foreign policy interest that the parties arbitrate rather than litigate in
U.S. courts.225 Given the judiciary’s historical reluctance to intrude
upon the foreign policy interests of the federal government,226 such a
statement is likely to carry significant weight. Second, the United
States should establish a trust where Holocaust survivors with

222. Jurisdictional Immunities of State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99, ¶ 91 (Feb.
3).
223. Id. at ¶¶ 92–97.
224. Id. at ¶ 91 (“[U]nder customary international law as it presently stands, a State is not
deprived of immunity by reason of the fact that it is accused of serious violations of international
human rights law or the international law of armed conflict.”).
225. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 405–06 (2003) (describing a similar
situation where the federal government would provide a statement that the foreign policy of the
United States favored resolving the disputes in an alternate forum).
226. See, e.g., Linda Champlin & Alan Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of
the Foreign Affairs Power, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 215, 216 (1985) (“It seems incredible that after two
hundred years of life under a written constitution which delineates governmental power and its
allocation, and which creates a Supreme Court to definitively determine controversies about power
and its allocation, the most basic questions concerning allocation of the foreign affairs power
remain unanswered.”).
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legitimate art restitution claims may opt for a monetary restitution in
lieu of arbitrating with a foreign government.227
Admittedly, this solution does not solve all the problems
surrounding the expropriation exception circuit split—foreign states
still will not know whether they can be sued in the United States under
a lower jurisdictional threshold. But this lack of clarity could serve one
purpose—as leverage against foreign states who might be reluctant to
agree to arbitration in lieu of litigation. As it stands, a foreign state that
is sued outside of the D.C. and Second Circuits will likely not be able to
take advantage of a stricter read of the FSIA.228 If the foreign state is
sued in the Ninth Circuit and the plaintiff can satisfy the lower
jurisdictional threshold, it will have to litigate.229 If it is sued in a circuit
that has not yet decided the expropriation exception issue, it will have
to roll the dice. And a plaintiff who meets the higher jurisdictional
threshold, while unlikely, will still be able to sue the foreign state in the
D.C. and Second Circuits. As a result, foreign states should be more
likely to agree to arbitration.230
More importantly, arbitration can offer a favorable alternative
to the long and expensive slog of litigation for foreign states. And while
many of the concerns that animate the efficacy of state-run art
restitution commissions hold water here,231 arbitration has been shown
to afford survivors extremely favorable outcomes. For example, Maria
Altmann, from the Altmann litigation, received five of her family’s
Klimt paintings after an arbitration with Austria.232 Altmann then
went on to sell one of the pieces—the famous portrait of Adele BlochBauer (or the “Woman in Gold” as it is commonly known)—for $135
million.233 Additionally, as noted above,234 plaintiffs with other types of
expropriation exception claims have an arbitral option—companies
whose business assets are expropriated can go to ICSID for relief.
While this Note does not endeavor to draw up the complex
scheme that would necessarily govern these types of claims, a few

227. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 405–06 (discussing a “voluntary compensation fund” which
could provide restitution if the parties waived any legal claims in the United States).
228. See supra Section II.A.
229. See supra Section II.B.
230. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 405 (discussing how German companies were willing to create
a voluntary compensation fund to avoid litigation).
231. See supra Part III.
232. Patricia Cohen, The Story Behind ‘Woman in Gold’: Nazi Art Thieves and One Painting’s
Return, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/arts/design/the-storybehind-woman-in-gold-nazi-art-thieves-and-one-paintings-return.html [https://perma.cc/X5CE33SZ].
233. Id.
234. See supra Part III.
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things are worth noting. First, establishing a procedure for appointing
neutral arbiters is essential. As mentioned in Part III, the appearance
of partial arbiters can damage the credibility of the tribunal and cause
foreign states to lose confidence in its results.235 Second, to the extent
the arbitral tribunal can institute mechanisms to ensure transparency
and expediency, it would ameliorate many of the problems associated
with state-run art commissions.236 Such mechanisms could include
publication of the arbitral tribunal’s outcomes or punitive sanctions for
dilatory tactics by the parties. Third, any arbitration scheme should
conform to the New York Convention and its domestic counterpart, the
Federal Arbitration Act.237
As an alternative to arbitration, survivors with legitimate stolen
art claims could also opt to be compensated through the executiveinitiated trust. Multiple organizations exist to facilitate survivors’
research.238 The trust can work with these organizations—or establish
a new one—to secure information about missing art, archival
information, and provenance research.239 This trust would be
responsible for setting up a new suite of procedures for sifting through
stolen art claims and determining which are viable and what level of
compensation is appropriate. Admittedly, a trust that compensates
families for stolen (and valuable) artwork will likely require quite a
large endowment to provide claimants with adequate restitution. But
faced with the cost of litigating these claims for years on end in U.S.
courts (the de Csepel litigation has been going on for almost ten years),
providing monetary payments to aggrieved plaintiffs could be a better
alternative.
This proposal follows similar agreements the U.S. government
has negotiated with France, Germany, and Austria for Holocaust-era
insurance claims.240 These agreements could provide the framework for
235. See supra Part III.
236. See supra Part III.
237. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2012); Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
238. International Organizations, CLAIMS CONFERENCE/WJRO, LOOTED ART & CULTURAL
PROP. INITIATIVE, http://art.claimscon.org/home-new/resources/overview-of-worldwide-looted-artand-provenance-research-databases/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/FV9K-8BFA]
(listing a number of organizations that assist with art recovery).
239. See Databases, COMM’N FOR ART RECOVERY, http://www.commartrecovery.org/databases
(last visited Feb. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/W4R7-8Z4J] (providing an organization whose
purpose is to assist in the post-Holocaust art restitution efforts).
240. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 405–08 (2003); see, e.g., Agreement
Concerning Payments for Certain Losses Suffered During World War II, Fr.-U.S., Jan. 18, 2001,
State Dep’t No. 01-36, 2001 WL 416465 [hereinafter Agreement Concerning Payments]. While
these funds have been criticized for failing victims, weighed against the policy of no monetary
compensation for their stolen art at all, it is better than the alternative. Joanne S. Hogan, Note,
American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi: The Power of the Executive Agreement, 18 TEMP. INT’L &
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designing the trust for art claims, which should include a dedicated
fund with compensation money, the regular issuance of public reports
regarding progress in compensating victims, a burden of proof scheme
for establishing title to disputed artworks, and an appeals mechanism
for those victims who are initially denied restitution.241 The most crucial
element of this trust fund will be constituting it with sufficient funds to
reasonably compensate plaintiffs who are seeking restitution for very
valuable items. Unlike the trust created by the 1973 Agreement
between Hungary and the United States, there will likely be far fewer
claimants pursuing much higher dollar amounts. Realistically, most
claimants will not be able to get the full value of their stolen relics (some
of which carry a significant price tag). But for plaintiffs who are not
interested in going to arbitration (or pursuing litigation in the United
States or elsewhere), this could be a favorable alternative.
Even more critically, survivors will not be required to pursue
relief through this fund. They may opt to go to arbitration instead, as
noted above, which could yield more creative and beneficial outcomes
than a court order in favor of one party or the other. Plaintiffs like the
de Csepels, who allege $100 million in stolen art, would be more likely
to fight for the return of their art in arbitration. A family with a single
stolen art piece, on the other hand, might be more amenable to being
paid out of the compensation fund rather than seeking relief through
arbitration or litigation. Importantly, survivors and their descendants
will have a choice between alternatives that do not involve “endless
litigation.”242
CONCLUSION
The executive branch should step in to provide relief to
Holocaust survivors while also protecting its foreign policy interests
and the presumption against suing foreign sovereigns in the U.S.
federal court system. It can do this through a series of executive
agreements that encourage arbitration or compensation through an

COMP. L.J. 431, 446–51 (2004). Concededly, compensation for looted art claims will likely be
costlier than the disputed life insurance policies this model is based on; however, there are
probably far fewer claimants. See id. at 437 (noting there were over five hundred thousand names
of survivors who were owed insurance policies); Eizenstat, supra note 2 (explaining that one
hundred thousand pieces of Nazi-looted art are still missing). Though, it seems unlikely that there
are even one hundred thousand viable looted art claims—the passage of time has undoubtedly
culled this number significantly.
241. See Agreement Concerning Payments, supra note 240, at *4–6 (providing the general
terms of the agreement).
242. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 405 (quoting United States Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright).
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established trust. While such executive action will not guarantee
restitution, it will ensure that survivors have the option to engage the
foreign state to seek restitution. While this is concededly a small
measure of justice for Holocaust victims, it is a measure of justice
nonetheless.
No amount of litigation, restitution, or money judgments can
cure what happened seven decades ago. But by working with foreign
states to remediate these thefts, the United States can help ameliorate,
bit by bit, the systematic destruction of European Jewish culture.
Earlier, this Note posited that sometimes the most moral result is not
the most practical one.243 Here, the U.S. government has the
opportunity to make the right result the just one as well.
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